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were to respond that ultimate authorship requires that an agent have
ultimate and direct control over what he or she does and the causally
undetermined nature of agent-causing makes this control possible, then
why could it not be the case that the causally undetermined nature of
choosing makes this control possible, without agent causation? Again, agent
causation seems explanatorily dispensible.
Though I have questions about the need for and existence of agent causation, I have no questions about the excellence of Free Will: A Guide for the
Perplexed. It is a first-rate and thought-provoking treatment of the topic of
freedom.

The Image in Mind: Theism, Naturalism, and the Imagination, by Charles
Taliaferro and Jil Evans. Continuum, 2011. 213 pages. $130 (hardcover).
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, Yale University.
The co-authors of this book, Taliaferro and Evans, are a professional philosopher and a widely exhibited painter, respectively. That leads one to
expect something out of the ordinary. And so it is. One doesn’t often find
a philosopher and a painter collaborating except, now and then, in a very
superficial way. The outcome of this collaboration is far from superficial. It
includes black and white reproductions of six paintings by Evans.
The authors nicely state the project of their book in the opening paragraph.
This is a book about images and imagination and their role in the greatest
philosophical debate in the modern era: the debate over the credibility of
theism versus naturalism. What is the theistic image of the world and how
does it differ from the naturalist image? What is beautiful or ugly, deep or
superficial, extravagant or empty, illuminating or stultifying, about these
images? How do these images impede or enlarge our moral and personal
lives? Despite the enormity of the naturalism-theism debate, there has been
insufficient attention to the aesthetic nature of the images and imagination
in these two profound visions of reality. (1)

Upon first reading, one wonders what the last of these five sentences has
to do with the four that precede it. What’s the connection between a study
of the role of images in the theism-naturalism debate and attention to the
aesthetic nature of those images? Shortly the connection becomes clear: the
authors argue that the aesthetic nature of the images contributes significantly to the role the images play in the debate. The authors take a broad
view of the aesthetic dimension of things. It consists, on their view, of “the
affective or emotive features of objects and events,” that is, of those features
to which we respond affectively, whether positively or negatively (38).
By “theism” the authors have in mind what they call Platonic theism.
“Central to such an outlook is an affirmation of the intrisic goodness of

112

Faith and Philosophy

the divine. It is in virtue of such divine goodness that theistic religions understand God to be worthy of praise, adoration, awe, love, and obedience”
(52). A satisfactory definition of “naturalism” proves harder to come by.
The authors distinguish between strict and broad naturalism. Strict naturalism holds that everything there is can be described in the terminology
of natural science. Those who embrace such naturalism either hold that
there are no such things as beliefs, intentions, consciousness, and the like,
or they hold that these are identical to brain states of one sort and another.
Those who embrace broad naturalism concede that there are these things
and that they are not identical with anything physical, but insist that in the
course of evolution they emerged from the physical.
Theism and naturalism, so understood, are commonly thought of as
consisting of theses, or propositions; the debate between these two positions is then thought of as a debate concerning which of the theses in
dispute are true and which are false, which are justifiedly held and which
are not so held, and so forth. Without denying that there is indeed this
sort of debate taking place over propositions, the authors argue that it is
illuminating to see the debate as a debate over images; and that in this
debate over images, affective responses to these images play a large role.
The theist images and experiences the world “as an intended, purposive,
valued reality”; the naturalist sees it as “not the result of [evolutionary]
forces that could have foreseen its reality” (145). The authors quote Daniel
Dennett as aligning himself with those “who love evolution,” and as saying that “there is humility, and awe, and sheer delight in the glory of the
evolutionary landscape” (158). The affective note here is obvious, as it is
in well-known passages that the authors quote from Richard Dawkins in
which Dawkins expresses his revulsion for Christianity.
The point eventually becomes obvious, and we are in debt to the authors for making it seem obvious: some people are drawn to the image of a
good and awesomely creative God who brings about a world imbued with
wisdom; others are drawn to the image of a mindless and purposeless evolutionary process that eventually brings forth beings like us. Many who are
drawn to the former image are repulsed by the latter; many who are drawn
to the latter image are repulsed by the former. The debate between theists
and naturalists is anything but a cool and rational assessment of evidence
pro and con various propositions.
In chapter 3 Taliaferro and Evans first insist that accepting the reality
of consciousness is far more plausible than denying it, and then go on to
argue that theism has a much more plausible way of accounting for the
emergence of consciousness than does naturalism; God, who is himself
conscious, brings about consciousness. Indeed, naturalism has no account
whatsoever; those naturalists who accept the reality of consciousness hold
that it emerged at a certain stage in the evolutionary process but have no
explanation of why that happened. So too, of course, they have no explanation of why there is a cosmos at all. In chapter 4 the authors argue for a
counterpart thesis concerning moral and aesthetic values: whereas theism
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has a plausible way of accounting for such values, naturalism does not. In
chapter 5 they observe that while naturalism would seem to have a more
plausible account of natural evils than theism does, a close scrutiny of
various accounts that theists have offered shows that this is not the case.
I find the arguments offered in these chapters competent, but neither
new nor deep. In good measure the authors conduct their argument by
the quotation of extended passages from other writers; that leads me to
conclude that it never was their intent to offer new and deep arguments.
Their intent was, instead, to call attention to the aesthetics of the debate.
But what does the aesthetic have to do with arguing that theism can
offer an account of some things that naturalism cannot account for at all,
that on other matters theism can offer a better account, and that on yet
others it can offer an equally good account? The clue to the answer is to
be found in the following passage: “In science as in art, one highly valued aesthetic feature is a cognitive, affective completeness or unity. That
we value unity or wholeness is exemplified in the centuries of recorded
human consciousness that acknowledges an awareness of incompleteness
and lack of wholeness” and a longing for the wholeness that is missing
(39). It’s an aesthetic deficiency in naturalism that it cannot account for the
existence of the cosmos, for the emergence of consciousness, and for moral
and aesthetic values.
For decades now philosophers of science have puzzled over why it is
that scientists prefer simple and elegant theories to complex and clumsy
theories. After all, what we want out of our theories is that they be true.
But simplicity and elegance are aesthetic qualities. Of course, if they were
truth-indicators, that would be a reason for preferring them. But why
would we think that they were? Or more precisely, if we were naturalists,
what reason could there be for thinking that they were? If we were theists,
we would have a good reason for thinking that they were truth-indicators.
Taliaferro and Evans have done us the service of pointing out that the
appeal to simplicity and elegance in scientific theories is but a small part
of the pervasive role of aesthetic categories in our conduct of the academic
enterprise. The title of their book, The Image in Mind, would seem to indicate that their main aim is to call attention to the role of images in the
academic enterprise and to the role of imagination as the producer of images. But eventually it becomes clear that the reason they want to call attention to the role of images is that they can then call attention to the role
of aesthetic considerations in our acceptance and rejection of images. They
don’t mount a defense of this role of images; they just call attention to it.
I wish they had mounted a defense. Or rather, I wish they had explored
when this role is good and when it is bad; Dawkins’s evident revulsion for
theism is hardly an admirable feature of his work.
A final small point. A large proportion of the text consists of extended
quotations from other authors; I cannot recall a text in which the proportion of quoted material was so large. I found myself of two minds about
this. I realize that the evidence for the claim that images and aesthetic
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considerations play a large role in the theism-naturalism debate will have
to consist of a sizable number of passages quoted from participants in that
debate. On the other hand, the extended argument, to the effect that theism has more explanatory power than naturalism, could well have been
presented more in their own voice and less in the voice of others.

Divine Evil? The Moral Character of the God of Abraham, edited by Michael
Bergmann, Michael J. Murray, and Michael C. Rea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 337 pages. $125.00 (hardcover).
PAUL COPAN, Palm Beach Atlantic University
In 2009, the University of Notre Dame hosted the “My Ways Are Not Your
Ways” conference. On the table was the topic of the moral character of
“the God of Abraham” as found in the Hebrew scriptures. The able philosophers and co-editors of this volume—Bergmann, Murray, and Rea—have
put together an important collection of essays on a subject getting increasing attention, due in some measure to the criticisms of the New Atheistic
foursome (Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, Dennett). In this volume, protagonists and antagonists directly address issues all-too-frequently evaded
by Bible readers—the nature of the God of the Hebrews, who apparently
“commends bigotry, misogyny, and homophobia, condones slavery, and
demands the adoption of unjust laws” (1).
Contributors friendly to the Hebrew God include Eleonore Stump,
Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Peter van
Inwagen, Mark Murphy, and John Hare. Those on the not-too-pleasedwith-God side include Louise Antony, Edwin Curley, Evan Fales, Wes
Morriston, and Paul Draper.
The book is divided into four parts: (I) Philosophical Perspectives:
Problems Presented; (II) Philosophical Perspectives: Solutions Proposed;
(III) Theological Perspectives; (IV) Concluding Remarks. What adds interest and depth to the book is the structure of each chapter (save the last), in
which the presentation is followed by an opponent’s comments, to which
the original presenter replies to round things out.
In the introduction, the editors analyze the various options on moral
difficulties in the Hebrew scriptures with, for instance, the category of
herem (“the ban/devotion to destruction”): (a) deny the texts are divinely
inspired; (b) deny God’s goodness; (c) declare the biblical text a mystery
on these matters; or (d) “(try to) revise one’s own moral values, intuitions,
or whatever in light of the text” (12).
Now, the book is not as wide-ranging as many of us would have wanted
it to be, and this is understandable given space limitations. Indeed, the Godcritics such as Louise Antony, Edwin Curley, and Evan Fales in particular

